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IS A PAID IDEA TUITION REIMBURSEMENT CASE MOOT?  
THE INTERSECTION OF PENDENCY, TUITION 
REIMBURSEMENT, AND MOOTNESS 
Daniel W. Morton-Bentley* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If a plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking $10,000 in damages and 
subsequently received a check from the defendant for $10,000, her 
lawsuit would be of no practical significance (moot). The court would 
then dismiss her case.  However, the matter is not so simple within the 
context of certain tuition reimbursement cases under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).  These cases typically involve the 
following scenario: parents enroll their children in private schools, file an 
administrative complaint alleging that their school district violated the 
IDEA, prevail in an administrative hearing, and receive reimbursement 
for the tuition paid to the private school as a remedy. The next school 
year, the parents file a new administrative complaint asserting another 
violation of the IDEA and, again, requesting tuition reimbursement. Due 
to the pendency provision of the IDEA, which requires school districts to 
ensure that students remain in their “then-current educational placement” 
during administrative or judicial review, the school district must ensure 
that the student remain in the private school. Courts have further held 
that the pendency provision, under these circumstances, obligates school 
districts to pay the private school tuition during the entirety of the 
subsequent proceeding. By the time such an administrative complaint is 
appealed to a court—sometimes several years later—the student’s tuition 
has been paid and the school district has most likely devised a new 
educational plan for the student. 
Are these cases moot? Courts have struggled to answer this question 
and have reached differing conclusions. This article explores how courts 
have applied the mootness doctrine to paid tuition reimbursement cases 
under the IDEA. This article further explains how courts have reached 
 
* Senior Attorney, New York State Education Department; LL.M Suffolk University Law School; 
J.D. Roger Williams University School of Law.  Thank you to Kaitlin Morton-Bentley for her 
insights and the editorial staff of the Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal for their 
careful editing.  The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 
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divergent results as the result of a conflict between the doctrines of 
pendency, tuition reimbursement, and mootness. Therefore, this article 
offers a proposed amendment to the IDEA that would reconcile these 
incongruous doctrines. 
Part II outlines the basic provisions of the IDEA, with special 
attention afforded to pendency and the availability of tuition 
reimbursement as a remedy. Part III is a brief summary of the doctrine of 
mootness and judicial exceptions to the doctrine. Part IV analyzes 
judicial decisions that have addressed the intersection of pendency, 
tuition reimbursement, and mootness and how these decisions have 
reached conflicting outcomes. Part V describes a proposed amendment 
that would resolve the question of whether paid tuition reimbursement 
claims are moot. Part VI offers a brief conclusion. 
II. THE IDEA 
A. Overview 
The primary goal of the IDEA is to ensure that students with 
disabilities are provided with a free appropriate public education 
(FAPE).1 To accomplish this goal, the IDEA offers financial assistance 
to states that comply with its procedures.2,3 
The most significant procedural requirements under the IDEA are 
detailed below. A school district must identify students with disabilities 
who reside within the district.4 Having done so, the school district must 
conduct an initial evaluation of these students.5 If the school district 
determines that these students have needs that require special education, 
the school district must generate an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) 
 
 1  See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2), (d) (2012); Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. 
Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192, 199, 200 (1982). 
 2  This article discusses Part B of the IDEA, which pertains to students aged 3–21.  Part C 
of the IDEA concerns Early Intervention services, which are special education services offered to 
infants through age two. 
 3  Strictly speaking, the IDEA is a funding statute—although it also contains elements of a 
civil rights statute.  For instance, the IDEA allows a parent who is a prevailing party to recover his or 
her attorneys’ fees (20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2012)).  Also, with regard to a student’s right to 
participate in extracurricular activities, the IDEA incorporates the civil rights standard imposed by 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (34 C.F.R. § 300.107 (2006)); § 34 C.F.R. 300.117 (2006); see 
Nonacademic Services, 42 Fed. Reg. 42,489 (Aug. 23, 1977) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 100(b), 
121(a), and 121(m)); Nonacademic Settings, 42 Fed. Reg. 42,497 (Aug. 23, 1977) (to be codified at 
45 C.F.R. pt. 100(b), 121(a), and 121(m)); Transfer and Redesignation of ED Regulations, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 77, 368, 77, 370 (Nov. 21, 1980) (to be codified 24 C.F.R. Ch. II); see generally Application of 
the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 13-152 (New York State Educ. Dep’t Office of State Review), 
available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/ 2013/13-152.pdf (last accessed Mar. 18, 
2015). 
 4  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111 (2006). 
 5  § 1414(a), (b). 
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for each student.6 The IEP is generated by an IEP team that includes the 
student’s parents, teacher, and a representative of the school district.7 The 
IEP identifies pertinent information about each student, including his or 
her academic, social, emotional, and physical levels.8 Each IEP must also 
contain annual goals based upon a student’s academic, social, emotional, 
and physical needs.9 After developing an IEP, a school district must 
generally implement it within its public school system. IEPs must be 
reviewed on an annual basis to ensure they continue to meet students’ 
needs.10 
If the parents of a student with a disability believe that an IEP was 
not developed in conformity with the IDEA, they have the right to 
administrative, and then judicial, review of the student’s IEP.11 
Specifically, parents may file an administrative form called a due process 
complaint notice that identifies the school district’s alleged violations of 
the IDEA.12 These allegations are adjudicated in an informal 
administrative trial presided over by an Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO); 
the officer is vested with the authority to determine whether the student 
received a FAPE.13 The decision of an impartial hearing officer is subject 
to judicial review, with some states, such as New York, providing a 
second level of administrative review by a State Review Officer (SRO).14 
B. Tuition Reimbursement 
The IDEA’s remedies include injunctive relief and reimbursement 
for private school tuition.15 Many jurisdictions also recognize 
compensatory education, an equitable remedy that provides students with 
educational services in order to make up for a denial of FAPE.16 While 
 
 6  § 1414(d). 
 7  § 1414(d)(1)(B). 
 8  § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) . 
 9  § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II). 
 10  § 1414(d)(4)(A). 
 11  20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6); (c)(2)(A); (f); (i)(2) (2012). 
 12  § 1415(c)(2)(A). 
 13  § 1415(f); see (f)(3)(E). 
 14  § 1415(g), (i).  While states use various initials or acronyms to refer to these 
administrative officials, I refer to the initial decision-makers as “IHOs” and the second-level 
reviewers as “SROs” throughout this article for consistency. 
 15  § 1415 (f)(3)(E)(iii) (injunctive relief: “Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to 
preclude a hearing officer from ordering a[n] [LEA] to comply with procedural requirements under 
this section.”); §1415(b)(1), 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) (2006) (independent educational evaluations); 
20 U.S.C § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2006) (tuition reimbursement). 
 16  See generally Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education: An Annotated Update of the 
Law, 251 ED. LAW REP. 501 (2010); see also P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 
2008); Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2008); Bd. of Educ. of Fayette 
Cnty. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2007); Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d 
1489 (9th Cir. 1994); Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  Courts 
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the IDEA was originally concerned with promoting access to the public 
education system, IDEA litigation has become increasingly concerned 
with tuition reimbursement.17 The remedy was endorsed by the United 
States Supreme Court in two seminal cases and later codified into the 
language of the IDEA.18 
The tuition reimbursement remedy is available to parents who, 
dissatisfied with the recommendations of an IEP, unilaterally enroll their 
child in a private school.19 If the parents file a due process complaint 
notice and an administrative officer finds that both (1) the school district 
did not offer the student a FAPE; and (2) the private school was 
appropriate to meet the student’s needs, the parent may recoup tuition 
paid (or owed) to the private school for the school year in question.20 
Additionally, in keeping with its civil rights leanings, the IDEA permits 
an award of attorneys’ fees to parents’ attorneys who substantially 
prevail in any aspect of an administrative or judicial proceeding.21 
C. Pendency 
A unique provision of the IDEA, and the provision giving rise to the 
issue discussed in this article, is its pendency provision.22 This provision 
 
unanimously agree that a claim for compensatory education presents a live controversy and insulates 
a case from being moot.  For recent cases, see J.T. ex rel. J.T. v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 564 F. App’x 
677 (3d Cir. 2014); L.O. ex rel. D.O. v. E. Allen Cnty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:11 CV 178, 2014 WL 
4905484 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2014); Simmons v. Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist., No. 4:13-CV-04446-
KAW, 2014 WL 2738214, at n.7 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2014); Fullmore v. D.C., No. 1:13-CV-00409 
(CRC), 2014 WL 1871343, at *3 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014); Morris v. D.C., No.: 14–0338 (RC), 2014 
WL 1648293 (D.D.C. April 25, 2014). 
 17  See Thomas Mayes & Perry Zirkel, Trends in Tuition Reimbursement Cases, 22 
REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 350 (2001). 
 18  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2012); see Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter By & 
Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of 
Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 373–74 (1985). 
 19  § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). 
 20  Although the IDEA and case law contemplate tuition reimbursement, a recent decision by 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a parent may pursue a direct payment from a school 
district to a private school “in appropriate circumstances.”  E.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 758 F.3d 
442, 453 (2d Cir. 2014). The court did not define what “appropriate circumstances” must exist 
before such a remedy becomes feasible.  Additionally, as recognized by the Court in Burlington, 
“equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief”, 
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374.  Many courts conceive of equitable considerations as a third 
requirement that must be assessed before tuition may be awarded to a parent. 
 21  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2012).  School districts may also recover attorneys’ fees under 
limited circumstances; see § 1415(i)(3)(B). 
 22  Courts have used different terms to describe this provision. See, e.g., Murphy v. 
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2002) (stay-put); Student X 
v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316 (NGG)(RER), 2008 WL 4890440, at *7, 15, 20–26 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008) (pendency); Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 
1996) (pendent placement).  I refer to this provision as “pendency” throughout this article for 
consistency. 
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requires in relevant part, 
[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this 
section, unless the State or [school district] and the parents otherwise 
agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement 
of the child  . . . .23 
The intention behind the pendency provision was to ensure that, if a 
dispute arose, a student with a disability would continue to receive 
services from his or her public school during the dispute. In other words, 
as explained by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Drinker by Drinker 
v. Colonial School Dist., pendency was intended “to strip schools of the 
unilateral authority that they had traditionally employed to exclude 
disabled students . . . from school.”24  It bears mentioning that 
“placement” has an idiomatic meaning within the context of the IDEA, 
referring to the general contours of a student’s special education program 
and not the literal “placement” of a student within a school building.25  
Thus, a student’s pendency placement refers to a program and not a 
physical location.26 
The IDEA’s pendency provision imposes a default rule: if parents 
and school districts disagree, then the student must stay in his or her 
current placement during administrative and judicial review. Therefore, 
an agreement between parents and the school district on an appropriate 
placement will always control. Courts have held that an administrative or 
judicial decision that a unilateral placement was appropriate constitutes a 
constructive “agreement” between the parties that the private school is a 
student’s pendency placement.27 This fiction obligates school districts to 
 
 23  20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2012). 
 24  Drinker by Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1996); see also 
George M. Holland, The Stay-Put Provision and its Implications to Practitioners, N.J. LAWYER: THE 
MAGAZINE, June 2003, at 35 (2003), available at http://www.njsba.com/images/content/1 
/0/1001996/june2003.pdf (last accessed Mar. 19, 2015). 
 25  See, e.g., T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 2009); James v. 
D.C., No. 12–376(RJL), 2013 WL 2650091, at *3 (D.D.C. June 9, 2013). 
 26  T.M. ex rel. A.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 171 (2d Cir. 2014) (“the 
pendency provision does not guarantee a disabled child the right to remain in the exact same school 
with the exact same service providers while his administrative and judicial proceedings are pending. 
Instead, it guarantees only the same general level and type of services that the disabled child was 
receiving”); Concerned Parents and Citizens for the Continuing Educ. at Malcolm X Pub. Sch. 79 v. 
N.Y.C Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 27  Bd. of Educ. of the Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Schutz, 290 F.3d 476, 484 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 83; Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cali. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 
635, 641 (9th Cir. 1990); Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Dep’t of Educ., Hawaii, 868 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 
1019 (D. Haw. 2012) aff’d sub nom. Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Dep’t of Educ., 506 F. App’x 613 
(9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished opinion); City Sch. Dist. of City of Buffalo v. Darlene S., No. 05-CV-
0572E(F), 2006 WL 287871, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2006). The IDEA’s implementing regulations 
explicitly provide that if an IHO’s decision in a one-tier State or an SRO’s decision in a two-tier 
State “agrees with the child’s parents that a change of placement is appropriate, that placement must 
be treated as an agreement between the State and the parents” 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(d) (2006). 
2_Morton-Bentley Edited (Do Not Delete) 8/1/2015  11:23 PM 
400 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2015 
maintain a student’s enrollment in a private school.  Further, courts have 
held that a school district must pay the student’s tuition at the private 
school during the pendency of the proceedings.28 This obligation is 
absolute: even if an administrative or judicial official eventually finds 
that the school district offered a student a FAPE, it may not recoup the 
tuition paid to the private school.29 
Having won a prior tuition reimbursement appeal, it is conceivable 
that a parent could maintain a student’s enrollment in a private school at 
public expense for several additional years by continuing to file 
administrative complaints. Thus, pendency can prove a significant boon 
for parents who seek to maintain their children in a private school at 
public expense.30 This remarkable effect of pendency is amplified by the 
length of the administrative and judicial review process. Although the 
drafters of the IDEA appear to have intended a quick resolution to 
impartial hearings, disputes can often last for several years. This delay is 
due to several reasons.  First, although the IDEA imposes deadlines for 
the issuance of administrative decisions at both the district and state 
level, federal regulations permit potentially indefinite extensions to these 
deadlines.31 Second, judicial decision dates are subject to varying court 
rules and internal deadlines. Finally, administrative and judicial 
tribunals, for a multitude of reasons, may not issue decisions in a timely 
manner. 
If the parties do not agree as to a student’s current placement and a 
 
 28  Schutz, 290 F.3d at 482–84; Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 
195, 200–01 (2d Cir. 2002); Zvi D. ex rel. Shirley D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906, 908 (2d Cir. 
1982); Vander Malle v. Ambach, 673 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1982); T.M. ex rel. A.M. v. Cornwall 
Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 11 CV 6459(VB), 2012 WL 4069299, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2012), vacated 
on other grounds, 752 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2014); N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ. v. S.S., No. 09 Civ. 810(CM), 
2010 WL 983719, at *1, *6, *8–*9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. L.P., 421 
F. Supp. 2d 692, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Gabel ex rel. L.G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 368 F. Supp. 2d 313, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Bd. of Educ. of City of New York v. Ambach, 612 
F. Supp. 230, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).  The Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari in M.R. 
v. Ridley Sch. Dist., a Third Circuit case challenging the scope of a school district’s obligation to 
pay private tuition under pendency. 744 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 2014).  Ridley affirmed that a school 
district’s obligation to pay arises at the time a due process complaint notice is filed and continues 
through the entirety of administrative and judicial proceedings. Id. at 123– 28.  The court concluded 
its decision by noting that it was “not insensitive to the financial burden [the] decision will impose 
on school districts” but reasoned that the pendency payment rule was “an unavoidable consequence 
of the balance Congress struck to ensure stability for a vulnerable group of children.” Id. at 128. 
 29  Clovis, 903 F.2d at 641; S.S., 2010 WL 983719, at *8–*12; D.C. v. Jeppsen, 468 F. Supp. 
2d 107, 112 (D.D.C. 2006) remanded on other grounds, 514 F.3d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Aaron M. 
v. Yomtoob, No. 00 C 7732, 2003 WL 22836308, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2003). 
 30  The administrative decision must explicitly indicate that the parent’s unilateral placement 
was appropriate (see L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 904 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(“Unless the district court or agency actually reaches the merits of the appropriate placement, we 
will not imply a current educational placement. . . .”). 
 31  34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c) (2006) (“A hearing or reviewing officer may grant specific 
extensions of time . . . at the request of either party.”). 
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parent did not previously prevail in a tuition reimbursement proceeding, 
a court or administrative agency must conduct a more fact-intensive 
investigation to determine what constitutes the student’s then-current 
educational placement. Courts utilize different approaches to make this 
determination, the three most prevalent being: (1) “the placement 
described in the child’s most recently implemented IEP”; (2) the actual 
placement operating at the time of the most recently implemented IEP; 
and (3) “the operative placement actually functioning at the time  . . . 
when the stay put provision of the IDEA was invoked.”32 An 
interpretative letter issued by the U.S. Department of Education’s Office 
of Special Education Programs (OSEP) in 2007 opined that a student’s 
pendency is determined at the time the due process complaint notice is 
filed, lending some support to the third formulation.33 
III. MOOTNESS AND STANDING 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “moot” as “[h]aving no 
practical significance; hypothetical or academic.”34 Thus, a moot case is 
one that presents no issues for a court to rule upon — or issues without 
practical import. Mootness can also be conceived of as “an extension of 
the doctrine of standing,” the doctrine that governs who may pursue a 
legal claim in federal court.35 According to the United States Supreme 
Court, “A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to 
grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.’”36 The Court 
also recently cited with approval the following statement from a 1984 
 
 32  Mackey ex rel. Thomas M. v. Bd. of Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 158, 
163 (2d Cir. 2004), supplemented sub nom. Mackey v. Bd. of Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 
112 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I., 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1019, aff’d 
sub nom. Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I., 506 F. App’x 613 (citing cases). 
 33  Letter to Hampden, 49 IDELR 197 (Dep’t of Educ. Office of Special Education Programs 
Sept. 4, 2007), available at https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/ guid/idea/letters/2007-
3/hampden090407stayput3q2007.pdf (last accessed Mar. 19, 2015).  An OSEP letter from two 
decades prior, however, noted that the last agreed-upon IEP would “generally be taken to mean 
current special education and related services provided in accordance with a child’s most recent 
[IEP]” (Letter to Baugh, 211 IDELR 481) (Dep’t of Educ. Office of Special Education Programs 
July 2 1987). 
 34  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (9th ed. 2009). 
 35   Corey C. Watson, Comment, Mootness and the Constitution, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 143, 
150 n.65 (1991) (citing Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 
YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973) [“The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement 
of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).]”).  Although some 
courts have indicated that the quote from Professor Monaghan originated with the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, this decision merely quoted Professor Monaghan’s 
formulation. 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980); see Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 
661 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 36  Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1335 (2013) (quoting Knox v. Serv. 
Emp. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012)). 
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case: “[A]s long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in 
the outcome of the litigation, [a] case is not moot.”37 
The Supreme Court has held that the mootness doctrine derives from 
the “cases” and “controversies” jurisdiction granted to the federal 
judiciary by Article III of the United States Constitution.38 Thus, in 
federal court, mootness is a constitutional predicate for jurisdiction.  This 
is relevant to the case law discussed in this article, which is largely 
(although not exclusively) composed of federal cases. A competing 
theory of mootness advanced by judges and commentators is that 
mootness is a prudential doctrine that merely provides judges with the 
discretion to excise non-adversarial litigation from their dockets.39 Some 
state courts adopted this interpretation.40 Scholars have produced 
gradations of these theories, but each generally aligns with the 
constitutional or prudential school.41 
A. Exceptions 
If a dispute is moot, the ordinary result is that the case is dismissed. 
Because mootness derives from the Constitution, federal courts must 
dismiss a moot case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, 
courts faced with what they deemed to be unpalatable results stemming 
from this doctrine created exceptions to the general rule. Most notably, 
an otherwise moot case may be retained by a court if (1) the complained-
of activity is capable of repetition, yet evading review; (2) dismissal of 
the case would impose collateral legal consequences on a party; (3) 
resolution of the case would be in the public interest; or (4) the defendant 
voluntarily ceased the activity giving rise to the lawsuit at some point 
during the litigation.42 
There are two requirements litigants must satisfy to avoid a mootness 
dismissal under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” 
 
 37  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2287 (quoting Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 442 (1984)). 
 38  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Straube v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F. 
Supp. 1164, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 39  Watson, supra note 35, at 151–53. 
 40  See, e.g., Hussein v. State, 81 A.D.3d 132, 135 (App. Div. 2011), aff’d, 19 N.Y.3d 899 
(2012); City of New York v. Maul, 59 A.D.3d 187, 197, 873 N.Y.S.2d 540, 549 (App. Div. 2009), 
aff’d, 14 N.Y.3d 499 (2010) (McGuire, J., dissenting). Therefore, a state whose constitution does not 
compel the dismissal of moot cases would arguably have greater discretion in deciding whether a 
moot case must be dismissed. 
 41  See Watson, supra note 35, at 150–59. 
 42  See, e.g., Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 
U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (capable of repetition yet evading review); Sibron v. N.Y., 392 U.S. 40 (1968) 
(collateral legal consequences); Barnett v. Adams, 273 P.3d 378, 381 (Utah 2012) (public interest); 
Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(voluntary cessation). 
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exception: (1) the complained-of activity must be “too short to be fully 
litigated prior to its cessation” and (2) there must be “a reasonable 
expectation that the [plaintiff will] be subjected to the same action 
again.”43 This exception requires that defendants remain accountable for 
wrongs committed against plaintiffs that are short in duration and likely 
to reoccur. The short in duration requirement ensures that defendants are 
not insulated from liability if their wrongful conduct happens to be short 
in duration. The recurrence requirement mitigates the exception, 
however, by requiring that the wrongful activity was more than a fleeting 
or isolated incident.44 
Additionally, some courts have applied a “collateral legal 
consequences” exception to moot claims.45 The first significant 
pronouncement of this doctrine came from the Supreme Court’s 1968 
decision in Sibron v. New York.46  In Sibron, the City of New York 
convicted the defendant of possession of heroin.47 The defendant moved 
to suppress the heroin before trial.48 When this motion was denied, the 
defendant pled guilty and received a six-month sentence.49 By the time 
the defendant’s appeal reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the defendant 
had served his sentence, but his appeal of the denial of the suppression 
motion remained pending.50 
The Supreme Court held that Sibron’s appeal was not moot, 
indicating that collateral legal consequences would affect the defendant 
were his appeal dismissed.51 In this respect, the Court announced a 
general rule: “a criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no 
possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the 
 
 43  Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482. 
 44  Briefly, I note that the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act does not affect the mootness 
inquiry because a federal court only has jurisdiction where there is an actual case or controversy (28 
U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. (2012); see Christopher P. by Norma P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir. 
1990); San Diego Cnty. Office of Educ. v. Pollock, No. 13-CV-1647-BEN BLM, 2014 WL 2860279 
(S.D. Cal. Jun. 20, 2014). 
 45  See Pollock, 2014 WL 2860279, at *3; Dep’t of Educ., State of Haw. v. Rodarte ex rel. 
Chavez, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1113 (D. Haw. 2000); Browell v. Lemahieu, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 
1128 (D. Haw. 2000); see also Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 799 (9th Cir. 
1999); Pub. Utilities Comm’n of State of Cal. v. F.E.R.C., 100 F.3d 1451, 1460 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(collateral legal consequences exception “is most commonly applied in habeas corpus proceedings 
where the petitioner has subsequently obtained the relief sought.”); Jenkins v. Squillacote, 935 F.2d 
303, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 46  Sibron v. N. Y., 392 U.S. 40 (1968).  Sibron’s appeal was a “companion case [ ]” (id. at 
43) to the Court’s famed well-known decision in Terry v. Ohio which upheld police officers’ right to 
stop and frisk individuals under certain circumstances.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 47  Sibron, 392 U.S. at 44. 
 48  Id. at 44–45. 
 49  Id. at 50–51. 
 50  Id. at 45, 50. 
 51  Id. at 50, 57. 
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basis of the challenged conviction.”52 In Sibron’s case, these 
consequences were potential impeachment and increased penalties 
(contingent upon his commission of a crime and subsequent 
prosecution).53 Without further elaboration, the Court also stated that 
“[t]here are doubtless other collateral consequences.”54 
The Sibron rationale has crept into civil cases.55 Some courts have 
even shifted the inquiry so as to hold that collateral practical 
consequences prevented cases from being moot.56 While practical 
consequences that pertain to “criteria that affect job accessibility and 
social status” are similar to the effects of a criminal conviction, other 
practical consequences—such as the payment of tuition costs under the 
IDEA—are far removed from the criteria envisioned by the Court.57 
Several state courts also apply a public interest exception to the 
mootness doctrine.58 Generally, this doctrine requires that a case present 
an issue of public importance that is likely to reoccur. While several 
courts have held that an injunction ordering compliance with the IDEA is 
in the public interest for purposes of a preliminary injunction, it is 
doubtful that a paid tuition reimbursement case would meet these criteria 
given its focus on compensation for a single student.59 
Finally, a court will refuse to find a case moot if a defendant 
voluntarily ceases the activity that gave rise to the litigation “at some 
 
 52  Id. at 57. 
 53  Id. at 55–56. 
 54  Id. at 56. The legal consequences that flow from a criminal conviction can indeed be 
numerous and severe.  A recent investigation found that “Federal, state, and local laws impose a 
convoluted network of barriers on anyone with a criminal record” and that “[t]hese collateral 
consequences of conviction . . . can affect nearly every aspect of a person’s life . . . .” Monica 
Haymond, Should A Criminal Record Come With Collateral Consequences?, NPR NEWS Dec. 6, 
2014, available at http://www.npr.org/2014/12/06/368742300/should-a-criminal-record-come-with-
collateral-consequences (last visited Mar. 19, 2015). 
 55  See David H. Donaldson, Jr., A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts 
Part One–The Continuing Impact Doctrines, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1289, 1314 (1976) and cases cited 
therein.  Not all courts have applied this doctrine in civil cases. See, e.g., Barnett v. Adams, 273 P.3d 
378, 381 (Utah 2012).  The U.S. Supreme Court explicitly dodged the issue in a 1978 case involving 
alleged collateral legal consequences stemming from suspension ordered issued by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. S.E.C. v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 108 n.3 (1978); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 
U.S. 480, 502 n.1 (1980) (Blackmun, J.J., dissenting). 
 56  Donaldson, supra note 55, at 1315, 1316. 
 57  Id. at 1317. 
 58  See, e.g., Barnett, 273 P.3d at 382; Glantz v. Daniel, 837 N.W.2d 563, 569 (Neb. Ct. 
App. 2013), review denied (Sept. 25, 2013); Gallery v. W. Va. Secondary Sch. Activities Comm’n, 
518 S.E.2d 368, 371 (W. Va. 1999); In re Laura H., 936 N.E.2d 801, 804–05 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).  
New York has condensed the capable of repetition yet evading review and public interest exceptions 
into a single exception. See Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 715, 409 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1980); 
Matter of McGrath, 245 A.D.2d 1081, 1082, 667 N.Y.S.2d 550, 551 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1997). 
 59  See W.H. ex rel. B.H. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., No. CVF080374LJODLB, 2009 WL 
2959849, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2009). 
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advanced stage of the appellate proceedings.”60 The rationale underlying 
this exception is that it would allow defendants to game the judicial 
system: a defendant could subject a plaintiff to illegal activity through 
the duration of legal proceedings and, at the last minute, escape liability 
by ceasing the activity before an appellate court rendered a decision. 
Under these circumstances, it would be inequitable to allow a defendant 
to take advantage of a dismissal based upon mootness. This exception is 
not applicable to the paid tuition reimbursement cases discussed in this 
article because any alleged harm would pertain to an expired school year 
and, thus, could not be remediated by a school district’s voluntary 
cessation of an activity. 
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF PENDENCY, TUITION REIMBURSEMENT, AND 
MOOTNESS 
Pendency, tuition reimbursement, and mootness have coalesced in 
several reported cases.  The bulk of these cases arise in New York, 
whose courts entertain an unusually high number of IDEA appeals.61 The 
cases discussed below present several factors to consider in determining 
whether a paid tuition reimbursement claim under the IDEA may be 
considered moot. Courts have generally found these disputes moot and 
proceeded to analyze them under the “capable of repetition, yet evading 
review” exception or the collateral legal consequence exception (which, 
as explained below, is more accurately characterized as a school 
district’s interest in avoiding future pendency obligations). 
A. Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review 
1. Honig v. Doe 
Before analyzing paid tuition reimbursement cases that have applied 
this exception, it is necessary to discuss the seminal case involving the 
IDEA and recurrence, Honig v. Doe.62 In Honig, two students eligible for 
special education as students with an emotional disturbance challenged 
 
 60  Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 331 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 61  See Perry A. Zirkel, Trends in Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: A Follow-Up 
Analysis, 303 ED. LAW REP. 1 (2014) (“[T]he top six jurisdictions in [impartial hearing] 
adjudications were, in descending order, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, New York, 
California, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, with a different sequence among them for filings.”); see 
also Perry A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE Under the IDEA, 33 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 214, 236 (2013) (“[T]he states of “Hawaii, New Jersey, and New York 
appear to have a particular propensity for tuition and related reimbursement [claims].”). 
 62  Honig, 484 U.S. at 305. 
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indefinite suspensions imposed by their school district.63 The activity 
giving rise to these suspensions was not insubstantial; one student 
choked a fellow student and left “abrasions on the child’s neck” while 
the other “st[ole], extort[ed] money from fellow students, and ma[de] 
sexual comments to female classmates.”64 The crux of the Court’s 
decision was that a school district may not unilaterally impose a 
suspension of more than ten days under the IDEA without violating the 
IDEA’s pendency protections.65 
Before reaching this conclusion, however, the Court examined the 
two plaintiffs’ standing to pursue their IDEA claims.66 One plaintiff, by 
the time of the Court’s decision, was twenty-four years old and no longer 
eligible for special education and related services under the IDEA.67 The 
Court dismissed this plaintiff’s claim as moot with little elaboration.68 
The second plaintiff, however, presented a more complicated factual 
scenario. On the one hand, he was “not faced with any proposed 
expulsion or suspension proceedings” and no longer resided within the 
defendant school district.69 But, on the other hand, this plaintiff remained 
eligible for special education services and had not yet graduated high 
school.70 
First, the Court in Honig found that the complained-of activity—a 
school suspension imposed following in response to classroom 
behaviors—was too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation. The 
Court noted, borrowing a phrase from an IDEA case issued three years 
prior to its decision, Burlington School Committee v. Mass. Department 
of Education, that the student had already been illegally kept out of 
school for years due to the “ponderous” nature of IDEA litigation.71 
Therefore, the Court implied that dismissing the case as moot would 
constitute a tacit endorsement of this lethargy. Thus, the Court concluded 
that the situation was too short in duration.72 
Second, the Supreme Court found that there was a reasonable 
expectation that the student would be subjected to the same action 
again.73  It based its holding on three considerations: (1) the student’s 
 
 63  Id. at 312. 
 64  Id. at 314–15. 
 65  Id. at 325–26. 
 66  Id. at 317–23. 
 67  Id. at 318. 
 68  Id. at 317–18. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. at 318, 337. 
 71  Id. at 322. 
 72  Id. at 333. 
 73  Id. at 322. 
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continued eligibility for services under the IDEA; (2) the “nature of [the 
student’s] disability”; and (3) the school district’s continued insistence 
that it could unilaterally withdraw IDEA-eligible students from public 
schools.74 The Court did not find the student’s residence within another 
school district relevant because California’s lack of a policy regarding 
disciplinary suspensions meant the student would have encountered this 
problem in any California school district.75 
2. Post-Honig analyses 
Following Honig, courts have agreed that claims relating to IEPs or 
IEP meetings—the bread and butter of tuition reimbursement claims—
are too short to be fully litigated prior to their cessation.76 These courts 
frequently reiterate the “ponderous” rationale in support of this 
determination.77 It appears, then, that the first prong of the capable of 
repetition exception will inevitably be satisfied in a tuition 
reimbursement claim. However, the second prong, which asks whether 
there is a reasonable expectation that the student will again be subjected 
to the same action, must also be satisfied. Analyses of this prong have 
produced varied outcomes. 
The three factors considered by the Court in Honig relate to the 
possibility of recurrence. The first factor asks how many years the 
student will be eligible for services under the IDEA. Thus, a claim 
presented on behalf of a student with few years of eligibility left would, 
according to Honig, be less likely to recur since there are less total years 
in which a parent could file a due process complaint notice. Taken 
literally, the second and third factors would not make much sense in the 
paid tuition reimbursement context where the student did not actually 
attend the public school placement recommended by the district. These 
can be better understood as fact-specific applications of the general 
question of how likely an act is to reoccur.78 
Reported cases have offered two additional IDEA-specific 
recurrence issues. One is whether the parties possess divergent views on 
educational issues affecting the student and, if so, how long they have 
held these views. For example, in Student X v. New York City 
 
 74  Id. at 318–19. 
 75  Id. at 321. 
 76  See, e.g., Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 85 (2d 
Cir. 2005); Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 2001); Daniel R.R. v. State 
Board of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1041 (5th Cir. 1989); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Board of 
Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 77  See cases cited in note 76, supra. 
 78  Whereas, in Honig, the student attended the public school system and, due to the nature 
of his disability, was likely to bring about the consequences complained of in the lawsuit. 
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Departmemnt of Education, the opposing parties consistently disagreed 
over the necessity of home-based services for several years prior to the 
school year challenged on appeal.79 This led the court to conclude that 
the parties possessed “divergent views” on the necessity of home-based 
services such that the plaintiff had a “reasonable expectation of 
confronting this controversy every year . . . .”80 Conversely, in Lillibask 
ex rel. Mauclaire v. State of Connecticut Department of Education, the 
school district contended that the student should be placed in a non-
public school for a single year and, over seven years after making this 
recommendation (and consistently educating the student within the 
public school system), conceded that its original position was no longer 
defensible.81 Under these facts, the Second Circuit found the dispute 
moot.82 
The second issue is how many IEPs the parent or parents have 
challenged. The assumption is that parents who have voiced objections to 
a district’s services year after year are more likely to complain the 
following year. Some courts, however, have not been persuaded by this 
rationale.83 The concern of these courts appears to be that parents could 
create the appearance of controversy by complaining year after year.84 
3.  M.S. ex rel. M.S. v. New York City Department of Education 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York, in no 
 
 79  Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316(NGG)RER, 2008 WL 4890440, at 
*4 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 80  Id. at *14; accord Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1403 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining case not moot) 
(“[T]he [d]istrict and the [parents] ha[d] conflicting educational philosophies and perceptions of the 
[d]istrict’s mainstreaming obligation.”); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1040 (5th 
Cir. 1989) (explaining case not moot) (“Each side of this controversy steadfastly adhere[d] to its 
perception of the [IDEA]’s mainstreaming requirement.”). 
 81  Lillibask ex rel. Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
 82  Id. A district’s change of position, in and of itself, would not appear a relevant factor.  
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 331 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see D.C. v. Jeppsen ex rel. 
M.J., 468 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 n.5 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Though it is likely both that [the district] will 
attempt to move [the student’s] placement in the future and that the change will be challenged by 
defendant, such likelihood does not create an exception to the mootness doctrine.”). 
 83  V.M. v. No. Colonie Sch. Dist., 954 F.Supp.2d 102 (N.D.N.Y. 2013); B.J.S. ex rel. N.S. 
v. State Educ. Dep’t, 815 F. Supp. 2d 601 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 84  The Supreme Court has disapproved of this practice.  See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 684 (1984) (“A litigant cannot, by the very act of commencing a lawsuit . . . create the 
appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it . . . .”).  It is of particular concern in the IDEA context 
as there is no filing fee associated with filing a due process complaint notice.  Additionally, the 
IDEA does not impose penalties or sanctions relating to frivolous administrative complaints.  The 
IDEA does, however, allow a court to award a school district or state educational authority 
attorneys’ fees if a “parent’s complaint or subsequent cause of action was presented for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of 
litigation.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III) (2012). 
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uncertain terms, rejected a paid for tuition reimbursement case in M.S. ex 
rel. M.S. v. New York City Department of Education.85 For the 2007–08 
school year, an IHO found that a June 2007 IEP did not offer the student 
a FAPE and that the parent was entitled to an award of tuition 
reimbursement at a private school.86 This IHO also ordered the district to 
reconvene an IEP meeting to develop an IEP for the student.87 The 
district complied, and the parent proceeded to challenge the resultant 
June 2008 IEP that applied to the 2008–09 school year.88 Both an IHO 
and an SRO found that the June 2008 IEP offered the student a FAPE.89 
The school district paid the student’s expenses at the private school for 
the 2008–09 school year pursuant to pendency.90 
On appeal, the parent argued that the administrative officers erred 
and that the school district failed to offer the student a FAPE for the 
2008–09 school year.91 The court handily rejected this argument.92 The 
court had little trouble finding the dispute moot, noting that the “parents 
receiv[ed] full compensation for their expenditures at the [private school] 
for the 2008–2009 school year.”93 The court also rejected the parents’ 
argument that the case was capable of repetition yet evading review 
“because each year a new determination is made based on [the student’s] 
continuing development, requiring a new assessment under the IDEA.”94 
The court further deduced that the true purpose of the parents’ appeal 
was attorneys’ fees.95 Noting that the parent “received exactly the kind of 
educational placement in a private school that he sought” and that “[t]he 
result [of the case] would have been exactly the same” had the attorney 
elected not to appeal, the court rejected the parent’s appeal and its 
accompanying request for attorneys’ fees.96 
4. New York City Department of Education v. S.A. ex rel. N.A. 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York squarely 
considered the issue of whether a challenge to an IEP for a paid and 
expired school year was moot in New York City Department of 
 
 85  M.S. ex rel. M.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F. Supp. 2d 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 86  Id. at 275. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. at 275–77. 
 89  Id. at 277–78. 
 90  Id. at 278. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. at 279–81. 
 93  Id. at 280. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. at 273. 
 96  Id. at 273; see id. at 281. 
2_Morton-Bentley Edited (Do Not Delete) 8/1/2015  11:23 PM 
410 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2015 
Education v. S.A. ex rel. N.A.97 The court began by noting that the parents 
and the school district had a “long history of litigation” over the student’s 
placement, dating back to 2004.98 The court also noted that an 
unappealed IHO decision pertaining to the 2006–07 school year 
established the student’s placement at the private school.99 One of the 
relevant due process complaint notices filed by the parents in the case 
requested tuition reimbursement for the 2009–10 school year.100 An IHO 
granted reimbursement, but an SRO reversed.101 The parents then filed an 
appeal in federal court in December 2010 (i.e. in the middle of the 2010–
11 school year).102 The district court agreed with the SRO in a separate 
decision that was issued in March 2012.103 
Contemporaneously with these events, the parents filed an 
“amended” due process complaint notice seeking tuition reimbursement 
for the 2010–11 school year in November of 2010.104 An IHO granted 
this relief in August of 2011 and the school district appealed to an 
SRO.105 Before an SRO issued a decision, the school district “fully 
reimbursed the [p]arents for all tuition and related services as to the 
2010–11 school year in accordance with . . . pendency.”106 An SRO thus 
dismissed the school district’s appeal as moot.107 The school district 
appealed the SRO’s dismissal of its appeal regarding the 2010–11 school 
year.108 
On appeal to the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, the court found the school district’s appeal presented a live 
controversy under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” 
exception. On the first prong of this exception, whether the action was 
too short in duration to be fully litigated, the court curtly concluded that 
it was given IDEA litigation’s “ponderous” nature.109 Turning to the 
 
 97  No. 12 CIV. 1108 DLC, 2012 WL 6028938 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 98  Id. at *2. 
 99  Id. at *2 n.3. 
 100  Id. at *2. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. 
 103  See J.A. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 10 CIV. 9056 DAB, 2012 WL 1075843 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
 104  N.Y.C. Dep’’t of Educ. v. S.A. ex rel. N.A., No. 12 CIV. 1108 DLC, 2012 WL 6028938, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  The court’s terminology here is likely incorrect; it would have been 
improper for the parents to amend their due process complaint notice as both the IHO and SRO 
issued their decisions before this alleged amendment (see J.A., 2012 WL 1075843, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (IHO decision issued in April 2010; SRO decision issued in August 2010). 
 105  S.A., 2012 WL 6028938, at *2. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. at *1. 
 109  Id. at *2. 
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second prong, whether the claim was reasonably capable of repetition, 
the court found that it was based upon two factors: (1) “the ongoing 
pecuniary interest of the school district based on the IDEA’s stay-put 
provision”; and (2) “the prospect of continuing litigation over the 
student’s placement.”110 As for the first factor, the S.A. court found “the 
[d]istrict’s obligation to pay [the student’s] tuition pending resolution on 
the merits of a given proposed, and rejected, IEP” would be uncertain 
absent a judicial resolution.111 Regarding the second factor, the court 
impliedly concluded that because the parties disagreed in the past, they 
would continue to do so in the future. Indeed, the court observed that the 
parents had already filed a due process complaint notice for the 2011–12 
by the time of the court’s decision.112 Therefore, the court concluded that 
there was “no question” that the present scenario fit the reasonably 
capable of repetition requirement.113 The court then remanded the case to 
the SRO to issue findings as to the disputed issues.114 
B. School Districts’ Future Pendency Obligation 
Some courts, as discussed below, have held that a district’s future 
pendency (i.e. financial) obligation may render a paid tuition 
reimbursement claim justiciable. The rationale is that there remains a 
controversy between the parties because without a judicial determination 
on the merits, a school district might have to finance a student’s 
education at a unilateral placement well beyond the school year (or 
years) challenged in a due process complaint notice under pendency.115 
Some courts have framed this inquiry in terms of the collateral legal 
consequences exception.116  However, it is more appropriate to view a 
district’s interest in avoiding indefinite pendency payments as an interest 
that presents a live controversy.  As noted above, the collateral legal 
consequences exception was intended to ensure that an unlawful 
 
 110  Id. at *2 n.4.  The court’s first reason is discussed more fully below in Section IV. B. 
 111  Id. at *2.  The court’s reliance on Bd. of Educ. of Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Schutz, was 
misplaced.  In Schutz, the district disputed its obligation to pay for the student’s placement at a 
private school during the pendency of proceedings (290 F.3d 476, 479 n.1 (2d Cir. 2002)).  
Subsequent law has clarified that the district was indeed responsible for doing so (Letter to 
Hampden, supra note 33; see also Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316(NGG)RER, 
2008 WL 4890440, at *23 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 112  S.A., 2012 WL 6028938, at *2. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. at *3. 
 115  On this note, courts have debated whether this interest may constitute irreparable injury 
sufficient to grant a preliminary injunction; compare D.C. v. Masucci, No. CV 13-1008 (PLF), 2014 
WL 331344, at *5 (D.D.C. 2014) (irreparable injury), with D.C. v. Vineyard, 901 F. Supp. 2d 77, 
88–89 (D.D.C. 2012) (not irreparable injury). 
 116  Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Dep’t of Educ., 868 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1017–18 (D. Haw. 
2012), aff’d sub nom. Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Dep’t of Educ., 506 F. App’x 613 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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conviction did not plague a criminal defendant. Dismissing such a case 
as moot would sanction (allegedly) illegal governmental activity long 
after the original criminal proceeding continued to have legal effects. 
Courts carried this doctrine into the civil context with little reasoning and 
its application in the IDEA context feels particularly strained.117 
1. V.S. v.  New York City  Department of Education 
In V.S. v. New York City Department of Education, a parent 
challenged a May 2009 IEP in a July 2009 due process complaint notice 
and requested tuition reimbursement for the 2009–10 school year.118 The 
student attended a private school pursuant to an IHO decision dated 
December 2008.119 In an April 2010 decision, an IHO sided with a parent 
and ordered tuition reimbursement for the 2009–10 school year. An SRO 
held that the case was moot because 2009–10 school year had expired 
and the parent would receive tuition reimbursement for this school year 
under pendency regardless of the SRO’s determination.120 On appeal, 
both parties urged the court to overrule the SRO’s mootness 
determination.121 
First, the court agreed with the SRO that “funding for the 2009–2010 
school year . . .  [was] no longer at issue.”122 The court further agreed that 
the parent’s sought relief would be unaffected by an administrative or 
judicial determination as to this issue.123 However, the court next 
determined that the case was not moot because “the [school district] 
s[ought] redress from an alleged injury that, although collateral to the 
central issue in the case, [wa]s ongoing and remediable.”124 The court 
identified this injury as the district’s future financial obligation of 
pendency. As the court explained that a determination of whether or not 
the school district offered a FAPE for the 2009–10 school year would 
“control [the student’s] pendency placement going forward.”125 
 
 117  In this regard, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that future financial 
obligation could constitute a collateral legal consequence in a non-IDEA civil case, Pub. Utilities 
Comm’n of State of Cal. v. F.E.R.C., 100 F.3d 1451 (9th Cir. 1996).  In the case, the petitioner and 
an intervener argued that dismissal on mootness grounds would bring about the “forced discounting 
of natural gas rates for state-regulated local distribution companies” as well as “lost revenues.”  Id. at 
1460.  The Ninth Circuit held that these financial concerns were not legal effects and thus did not 
justify imposition of the collateral legal effects doctrine.  Id. at 1460–61. 
 118  No. 10–CV–05120 (JG)(JO), 2011 WL 3273922, at *3, *4 (E.D.N.Y 2011). 
 119  Id. at *3. 
 120  Id. at *8. 
 121  Id. at *9. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id. 
 125  Id. at *10. 
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Therefore, based upon this injury, the court found that the dispute was 
not moot. On the merits of the case, the court held that the school district 
failed to offer the student a FAPE, the unilateral placement was 
appropriate, and that no equitable factors diminished or precluded an 
award of tuition reimbursement.126 
2. Pawling Center School District v. New York State Education 
Department 
In Pawling Center School District v. New York State Education 
Department, a school district appealed a decision that it failed to offer 
the student a FAPE for the 1999–2000 school year.127 A prior SRO 
decision established the student’s pendency placement at a private 
school.128 The school district paid the student’s tuition during the 1997–
98 and 1998–99 school years.129 For the 1999–2000 school year, the 
school district developed an IEP that recommended placement in a public 
school.130 The parents filed a due process complaint notice alleging a 
denial of FAPE and requesting tuition reimbursement for the 1999–2000 
school year.131 An IHO found that the district offered a FAPE.132 An SRO 
reversed, finding that the district failed to offer a FAPE and that the 
unilateral placement was appropriate.133 
On appeal, the school district admitted that it was financially 
responsible for the 1999–2000 school year and that no determination by 
the Appellate Division would affect the student’s placement during the 
expired 1999–2000 school year.134 Nevertheless, the school district 
argued that the appeal was not moot because the court’s determination 
would affect the student’s future pendency placement.135 The Appellate 
Division agreed with this argument, briefly stating that “a decision in 
[the district’s] favor . . . could alter the child’s current educational 
placement . . . [as well as] petitioner’s concomitant responsibility to pay 
tuition during any challenges to future IEPs.”136 As for the substantive 
issues in the case, the court agreed with the SRO and affirmed the private 
 
 126  Id. at *13–17. 
 127  3 A.D.3d 821, 824 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
 128  Id. at 822. 
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. at 823. 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. at 824. 
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school as the student’s pendency placement going forward.137 
3. Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Department of Education 
While it recognized the effect of a judicial decision on a school 
district’s future pendency obligation, the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
argument that this interest presented a live controversy in Marcus I ex 
rel. Karen I. v. Department of Education.138 The student had attended a 
private school since 2001.139 For the 2007–08 school year, the school 
district recommended a residential placement for the student.140 The 
parent objected and filed a due process complaint notice.141 The sole 
issue in the due process complaint notice was whether the residential 
program constituted, as required by the IDEA, the student’s least 
restrictive environment (LRE).142 An IHO rejected the parents’ claims 
and held that the recommended placement was the LRE.143 
In a decision dated May 23, 2011, the Ninth Circuit indicated that the 
issue of whether a residential placement represented the LRE for the 
student during the 2007–08 school year was moot.144 The court noted that 
the IEP developed for the subsequent 2008–09 school year reversed 
course and recommended placement in a public school.145 This led the 
court to conclude that the school district “apparently no longer believe[d] 
that [the student] need[ed] a highly restrictive residential program.”146 
Further, the court noted that the student “remained at [the private school] 
pursuant to the IDEA’s stay-put provision” and did not enroll in the 
 
 137  Id.  In a footnote, the court acknowledged that this could produce a curious result as, at 
the time of the court’s decision, the student no longer attended the private school in question. Id. at 
824 n.2. 
 138  434 F. App’x 600, 601 (9th Cir. 2011). Strictly speaking, Marcus I is a partially-paid 
tuition reimbursement case.  Before the district court, the parents complained that the district was 
responsible for the costs of the student’s education at the private school and had not issued payment.  
The court found that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain this claim as it was not raised in the 
parents’ due process complaint notice.  Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Haw., Dep’t of Educ., No. 08–
00491 DAEBMK, 2009 WL 3378589, at *10 (D. Haw. Oct. 21, 2009).  The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 
Marcus I., 434 F. App’x at 602. Nevertheless, Marcus I is a paid tuition reimbursement claim in 
substance notwithstanding the district’s alleged failure to satisfy its pendency obligations. 
 139  Marcus I., 2009 WL 3378589, at *1 (district court decision). 
 140  Id. at *2. 
 141  Id. at *3. 
 142  Id. at *3. It is unclear whether the parent requested an award of tuition reimbursement. 
See id. However, given the student’s pre-existing pendency entitlements, Marcus I. is nevertheless 
relevant to the issue discussed in this section. 
 143  Id. at *3, *5–7. 
 144  Marcus I ex rel. Karen I. v. Dep’t of Educ. 434 F. App’x 600, 601 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ninth 
Circuit decision). 
 145  Id. 
 146  Id. 
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residential program.147 Therefore, according to the court, it was “unclear 
what effect any decision by this court would have on the parties.”148 
The parent specifically argued that the appeal was not moot because 
“it would affect whether the [school district] allow[ed] him to remain at 
[the private school] pursuant to the stay-put provision.”149 The Ninth 
Circuit rejected the argument that the pendency provision “guarantee[d] 
a child the right to remain in any particular institution once proceedings 
have concluded.”150 Even more to the point, the court stated that: 
[T]he fact that dismissing an appeal as moot would remove a child 
from the protection of the stay-put provision cannot in and of itself 
create a live controversy, as the stay-put order will lapse however the 
litigation concludes.151 
C. Attorneys’ Fees 
Because it can be the driving force in pursuing otherwise moot 
claims, it is necessary to offer a final note on the applicability of 
mootness to an attorneys’ fee determination. As noted above, parents 
may recover their attorneys’ fees if they are deemed prevailing parties in 
IDEA litigation. This includes fees expended at both the administrative 
and judicial level. If a court declares a dispute moot because it was paid 
for under pendency, attorneys’ fees related to the court proceeding—i.e., 
the proceeding where the dispute was deemed moot—will not be 
recoverable.152 A judicial determination of mootness, however, does not 
otherwise affect a party’s prevailing party status.153 Courts have reasoned 
 
 147  Id. at 602. 
 148  Id. 
 149  Id.  The parent characterized this as a “collateral legal consequence.”  Id. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. 
 152  O’Shea v. Bd. of Educ. of Poughkeepsie City Sch. Dist., 521 F. Supp. 2d 284, 291 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); see M.S. ex rel. M.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F. Supp. 2d 271, 273 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010); D.C. v. Jeppsen ex rel. M.J., 468 F. Supp. 2d 107, 113 (D.D.C. 2006); see also 
Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 605 (2001).  For a useful general discussion of prevailing party status under the IDEA, see A.R. 
ex rel. R.V. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 153  For example, in J.S. ex rel. Z.S. v. Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., 501 F. App’x 95, 97–98 (2d 
Cir. 2012), a May 2009 IHO decision found that the parents were entitled to tuition reimbursement 
for the 2007–08 school year.  Id. at 97.  This school year had been paid through pendency. Id. The 
SRO deemed the appeal moot. Id. The District Court awarded fees for the IHO proceedings but did 
not award “any fees incurred in drafting” the documents submitted to the SRO, J.S. ex rel. Z.S. v. 
Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 7:10 CV 8021(VB), 2011 WL 3251801, at *6–8 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 
2011).  The District Court also awarded attorneys’ fees connected with the District Court action even 
though neither party appealed the SRO’s decision because “[d]espite due demand, [the school 
district] . . . refused to pay any attorneys’ fees or costs incurred by plaintiffs. . . .”  J.S., 2011 WL 
3251801, at *2.  Without discussion of the effect of the SRO’s mootness determination (or whether 
mootness may be applied in an administrative context), the Second Circuit declared the parents 
prevailing parties and upheld the District Court’s determination. J.S., 501 F. App’x at 98–99. 
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that a decision giving rise to prevailing party status must “alter the legal 
relationship between the parties,” and the parties’ legal rights with regard 
to a paid and expired school year could not possibly be altered by a 
judicial decision. Additionally, it bears mentioning that, as seen in M.S., 
attorneys’ fees do not render an otherwise moot action justiciable.154 
V. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
Faced with the issue of whether a paid tuition reimbursement case is 
moot, the above cases have reached varied conclusions. A review of 
these decisions reveals that there is no satisfactory resolution to this 
problem under current law. The argument for mootness correctly 
recognizes that a dispute is moot if the complaining party received all of 
the relief he or she requested. However, it turns a blind eye to the 
advantageous circumstances that a mootness dismissal can bestow upon 
parents intent upon educating their children in private schools. Both 
exceptions to the mootness doctrine discussed above address this 
inequity, but ignore the fact that satisfaction of a plaintiff’s requested 
relief (i.e., tuition reimbursement) leaves nothing for a court to 
adjudicate. Therefore, I propose an amendment to the IDEA that would 
reconcile the conflict between pendency and mootness. Given the 
jurisprudential (and, in federal court, Constitutional) roots of the 
mootness doctrine, change must lie with pendency. 
I contend that the pendency provision should be amended to address 
paid tuition reimbursement claims and provide an incentive for students 
to remain in the public school system. Specifically, school districts 
should be afforded an opportunity to implement students’ pendency 
placements within a public school.155 School districts interested in 
pursuing this option would be required to submit a written letter to 
parents that identifies the student’s then-current educational placement 
and offers to implement it in a public school by the start of the upcoming 
 
 154  M.S., 734 F. Supp. 2d at 273, 281; see Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 
(1990) (“[an] interest in attorney’s fees is, of course, insufficient to create an Article III case or 
controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim. . .”); M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. 
Dist., 767 F.3d 842, 857 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended Oct. 1, 2014 (“[t]he existence of an attorneys’ 
fees claim . . .  does not resuscitate an otherwise moot controversy.”), quoting Cammermeyer v. 
Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Spirit of the Sage Council v. Norton, 411 F.3d 
225, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 155  This approach is consistent with the Second Circuit’s approach in T.M. ex rel. A.M. v. 
Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 172 (2d Cir. 2014).  In T.M., the district offered to 
implement summer services that were currently provided by private providers. Id. at 171–72. The 
parents declined, preferring the “stability and consistency” of the private services. Id. at 172. The 
Second Circuit reversed this determination and stated that “the IDEA does not bar [a school district] 
from subsequently correcting its mistake and offering to provide the required pendency services 
directly.” Id. at 171. 
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school year. If accepted by a parent, the school district would be required 
to implement this program at the start of the school year or as soon as 
reasonably possible. If a school district failed to implement this 
pendency placement or chose to forego this procedure entirely, it would 
remain responsible for the private tuition under current pendency 
doctrine. 
Should parents refuse a school district’s offer, they would remain 
free to proceed to an impartial hearing. However, the school district 
would not be responsible for private tuition costs as the proceeding 
unfolded. To the extent this forces a parent to choose between accepting 
a deficient IEP or accepting financial risk by enrolling the student in a 
private school, this dilemma is already being faced by parents who 
cannot take advantage of private school pendency. The current pendency 
arrangement singles out a subset of parents for financial advantage and 
condemns the rest to financial risk. If some parents must “unilaterally 
change their child’s placement during the pendency of review 
proceedings . . . at their own financial risk,” it is unclear why others are 
absolved from this requirement based on a prior administrative victory.156 
This amendment eliminates the mootness problem. If a parent 
accepted a school district’s offer of public implementation, the parent 
could not request tuition reimbursement for that school year because the 
student was in a public school. If a parent rejected the offer, he or she 
would not be entitled to funding from the school district during 
administrative and judicial review by the terms of the amendment. And if 
the school district did not utilize this procedure, its future pendency 
obligation would not be a relevant factor in a mootness analysis because 
it could utilize the written notice option to avoid these costs in the 
following year.157 This amendment would additionally clarify the 
meaning of “placement” in the pendency context.158 
Proposed language for this amendment follows. For consistency, the 
proposed amendment uses “school district” where the IDEA would use 
“local educational agency.” 
  
 
 156  Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 
373–74 (1985).  Burlington held that parents do not waive their right to tuition reimbursement when 
they unilateral place a child in a private school.  The school district’s argument to the contrary was 
based upon the language of the pendency provision.  See id. at 370–72. 
 157  This approach does not eliminate all the ambiguities or problems associated with penden-
cy.  For example, an IHO would have to determine whether a school district’s offer of a similar but 
not identical program would allow it to take advantage of this written notice provision. 
 158   T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 2009); James v. D.C., No. 12–
376(RJL), 2013 WL 2650091, at *3 (D.D.C. June 9, 2013). 
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A. Current Educational Placement Where Student Attends a Private 
School at Public Expense 
(a) This section shall apply to students who, as the result of an 
administrative or judicial determination that a school district failed to 
make FAPE available and that a private school was appropriate, 
currently attend a private school at public expense. 
(b) If a parent files a due process complaint notice and the 
circumstances described above in paragraph (a) are present, the 
student’s then-current educational placement shall refer to his or her 
educational program and not a physical location. 
(c) If the parent rejects a written offer submitted by the school district 
ten (10) days after the filing of a due process complaint notice whereby 
the school district offers to implement the student’s then-current 
educational placement in a public or state-approved nonpublic school, 
the school district shall not be responsible for the student’s tuition costs 
during administrative or judicial review pertaining to the 
aforementioned due process complaint notice. 
(i) The written offer described in paragraph (c) above shall identify 
the student’s then-current educational placement which shall 
include, but shall not be limited to, the classroom type (e.g., 
regular or special classroom), student to teacher ratio, frequency 
and duration of related service sessions, supplementary aids and 
services, and any services, devices, or plans pertaining to special 
factors. 
(ii) If the parent accepts the written offer described in paragraph 
(c) above, the school district must implement the offered 
placement at the start of the school year or as soon as reasonably 
possible. If a school district fails to implement this placement, the 
school district must pay the student’s tuition at a private school 
during the pendency of administrative and/or judicial review when 
and until the due process complaint is resolved. 
(iii) If a school district fails to implement the program outlined in 
its written offer within a reasonable period of time, a parent may 
resort to the due process procedures outlined in part (f) of this 
Section. 
(iv) If information as to the student’s then-current educational 
placement is not available to the school district and the parents do 
not respond to reasonable requests for this information, an 
impartial hearing officer may take this into account in determining 
whether a school district shall be responsible for the student’s 
tuition costs during administrative or judicial review. 
(d) Nothing in this section shall affect a parent’s right to reimbursement 
for private tuition expenses if an administrative or judicial official 
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concludes that a school district failed to make FAPE available and that 
the services unilaterally obtained by the parent were appropriate. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
No court has been able to satisfactorily resolve whether paid tuition 
reimbursement claims are moot. This is due to the irreconcilable 
relationship between tuition reimbursement, mootness, pendency, 
judicial interpretations of these concepts. Therefore, this article proposes 
an amendment to the IDEA’s pendency provision that would solve this 
problem. Under this approach, a greater number of cases would be 
deemed moot. This would not favor parents or school districts—it would 
simply favor whoever was the victor at the administrative level. It would, 
however, conserve judicial resources which, at present, are being used to 
decide what otherwise appear to be moot cases. Mootness is a judicial 
imperative that should be respected by amending the IDEA to prohibit 





 159  See Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990). 
